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We prove the unconditional security of the standard six-state scheme for quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD). We demonstrate its unconditional security up to a bit error rate of 12.7 percents, by
allowing only one-way classical communications in the error correction/privacy amplification pro-
cedure between Alice and Bob. This shows a clear advantage of the six-state scheme over another
standard scheme—BB84, which has been proven to be secure up to only about 11 percents, if only
one-way classical communications are allowed. Our proof technique is a generalization of that of
Shor-Preskill’s proof of security of BB84. We show that a advantage of the six-state scheme lies
in the Alice and Bob’s ability to establish rigorously from their test sample the non-trivial mutual
information between the bit-flip and phase error patterns. A modified version of the degenerate
quantum codes studied by DiVincenzo, Shor and Smolin is employed in our proof.
PACS Numbers:
I. BB84
Whereas conventional cryptography is often based on
some unproven computational assumptions, the security
of quantum key distribution [1–4] ∗ is guaranteed by the
fundamental laws (particularly the uncertainty principle)
of quantum mechanics. The best-known quantum cryp-
tographic application is quantum key distribution (QKD)
whose goal is to allow two persons, Alice and Bob, to
communicate in perfect security in the presence of an
eavesdropper, Eve.
A number of years had passed before rigorous and con-
vincing proofs of security against the most general attack
finally appeared. Mayers [11] and subsequently others
[12] have proven the security of the standard Bennett and
Brassard’s BB84 scheme [1], a scheme that is closer to
a realistic experimental situation. Unfortunately, those
proofs are rather complex. A proof by Lo and Chau
[8] has the advantage of being conceptually simple, but
it requires a quantum computer to implement. Their
proof built on earlier work on quantum privacy amplifi-
cation [9] and has subsequently been further simplified
[10]. Recently, Shor and Preskill [13] have proposed a
simple proof of security of BB84 by combining and gen-
eralizing the insights in Lo and Chau’s [8] and Mayers’
[11] proofs. Their proof also extends the tolerable error
rate of BB84 from about 7 percents set by Mayers’ proof
∗Quantum cryptography, but not quantum key distribution
per se, was invented by Stephen Wiesner around 1970 in a pa-
per that remained unpublished until 1983 [5]. Quantum key
distribution is experimentally the most advanced subfield of
quantum information processing. Photons have been trans-
mitted over about 50km of commercial Telecom fibers [6] and
over 1km of open air [7].
to about 11 percents.†
Other QKD schemes have also been proposed.‡ A no-
table example is the six-state scheme proposed by Bruss
[16]. Recently, a proof of security of the six-state scheme
has been proposed by Inamori [17], which, unlike Shor
and Preskill’s proof of security of BB84, requires two-
way classical communications between Alice and Bob.
Until now, it was not obvious how to generalize the
proof technique of Shor-Preskill’s proof, which requires
only one-way classical communications, to the six-state
scheme. The main goal of this paper is to provide pre-
cisely such a simple proof of security for the six-state
using Shor and Preskill’s approach. Our result shows
that, using only one-way classical communication, six-
state QKD scheme can be made secure up to an error rate
of about 12.7 percents. This is higher than the value of
about 11 percents in the case of Shor-Preskill’s result in
BB84, thus demonstrating the advantage of the six-state
scheme over BB84. Our proof also clarifies the symmetry
structure employed in Shor and Preskill’s proof.
A key idea of Shor-Preskill’s proof is reduction: Instead
of tackling the security of BB84 directly, they took an in-
direct path. They constructed a QKD scheme that em-
ploys entanglement purification (i.e., it requires a quan-
tum computer to implement) and showed that such a
scheme is secure. Then, they showed that the security
of such an entanglement-purification-based QKD scheme
implies the security of BB84. In their proof, the bit-flip
and phase errors of the underlying entanglement purifi-
†Mayers’ proof also permits the same extension.
‡For instance, an efficient four state scheme has been pro-
posed and its unconditional security was proven in [14]. Be-
sides, the security of a continuous variable (squeezed state)
QKD scheme has been proven by Gottesman and Preskill [15]
using the same approach of Shor and Preskill’s proof.
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cation protocol may be totally uncorrelated. Therefore,
in the worst case situation, the bit-flip error syndromes
tell the two users nothing about the phase errors.
In this paper, we will follow Shor-Preskill’s approach
for the case of a six-state QKD scheme. We see a clear
advantage of the six-state scheme over BB84: As will
be discussed in subsequent sections, for the six-state
scheme, one can show that in the corresponding under-
lying entanglement-purification-based QKD scheme, the
bit-flip and phase errors are correlated.§ In other words,
the bit-flip error syndromes can be used to reduce the
conditional entropy of the phase error pattern. This re-
duction in conditional entropy makes the task of entan-
glement purification easier and allows us to establish the
security of the six-state scheme up to an error rate of 12.7
percents.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review Shor-Preskill’s proof. In Section 3, we study the
differences between BB84 and the six-state scheme, em-
phasizing the ability by Alice and Bob to establish the
correlations between the bit-flip and phase error patterns
in the six-state scheme, but not in BB84. In Section 4,
our protocol for secure six-state QKD scheme is given.
Section 5 contains various concluding remarks.
II. SHOR-PRESKILL’S PROOF
In this section, we shall recapitulate briefly Shor and
Preskill’s proof [13] of security of BB84. A nice review of
Shor and Preskill’s proof can be found in the early sec-
tions of [15]. Readers who are familar with the subject
can skip this section. Before we go to the specifics, we
should first review the three major ingredients of their
proof: entanglement purification, classicalization (i.e.,
quantum to classical reduction) and CSS codes.
A. Entanglement purification
Entanglement purification was first studied by Ben-
nett, DiVincenzo, Smolin and Wootters [18] and its usage
in QKD was first proposed by Deutsch et al. [9]. Sup-
pose Alice prepares n EPR pairs and sends the half of
each pair to Bob through a channel controlled by Eve.
Because of Eve’s interference, the n EPR pairs are now
noisy. However, Alice and Bob can purify from the n
§As shown in subsequent sections, the six-state QKD scheme
can be made symmetric with respect to all three bases, X, Y
and Z. In the language of entanglement purification, this
corresponds to a so-called depolarizing channel. Therefore,
the bit-flip and phase errors are, indeed, correlated.
imperfect pairs a smaller number, say m, perfect EPR
pairs, provided that the channel is not too noisy.
B. Classicalization
A key question remains: how can one verify that the
channel is, indeed, not too noisy? This is not entirely
trivial because noise pattern of the channel is controlled
by Eve and does not have to be independent. More-
over, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox tells us that
it would be too naive to apply classical arguments blindly
to a quantum problem. This is where the classicalization
(quantum to classical reduction) idea of Lo and Chau [8]
comes in.
The key idea is “commuting observables”, i.e., one
should focus on observables that commute with each
other. For those observables, it is consistent to assign
probabilities to their simultaneous eigenstates and study
those probabilities by classical probability theory, partic-
ularly classical random sampling theory. This leads to
substantial simplification of the original quantum prob-
lem. [This “commuting observables” idea is the essence
of the stabilizer formalism of Gottesman [21] and Calder-
bank et al. [22].]
More concretely, Alice and Bob can figure out the error
rate of the two (rectilinear or diagonal) bases by random
sampling. That is to say that, for each basis, Alice and
Bob select a random subset of test EPR pairs and com-
pare their polarizations of the two halves of a pair to see
if they agree. Mathematically, this is equivalent to mea-
suring the either operator XX and ZZ, where X and Z
are respectively the Pauli matrices, σx and σz. The key
observation here is that XX commutes with ZZ. There-
fore, the commuting observables idea indeed applies and
probabilities to the simultaneous eigenstates can be as-
signed to Alice and Bob’s state.
With the above two ingredients—entanglement purifi-
cation and classicalization, one can prove the security of
QKD by intuitive classical argument [8]. Nonetheless,
the resulting protocols still require quantum computers
to implement. This is because a general entanglement
purification protocol requires a quantum computer for
its implementation. It is the following insight of Shor
and Preskill [13] that allows one to implement a secure
QKD scheme without a quantum computer.
C. CSS codes
Their proof makes essential use of the Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) code. The CSS code has the useful
property that the error correction procedure for the phase
error is decoupled from that for the bit-flip error. Clearly,
bit-clip error correction is important to ensure that Al-
ice and Bob do share a common key. However, Shor and
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Preskill made the following important observation: Since
phase errors will not change the bit value of their final
key anyway, Alice and Bob have the liberty of dropping
the whole phase error correction procedure altogether.
This is the fundamental reason why they can implement
a CSS code-based QKD scheme without a quantum com-
puter. General quantum error correcting codes can also
be used for QKD, but it is unclear how to implement
those QKD schemes without a quantum computer.
Even though the phase error correction procedure is
dropped in BB84, it is, nonetheless, important that the
phase error is, in principle, correctable by the underly-
ing quantum error correcting code because only then can
security be guaranteed by the quantum no-cloning the-
orem. In other words, Alice and Bob do not need to
perform phase error correction. The very fact that Al-
ice and Bob could perform phase error correction (if they
had quantum computers) would be enough to guarantee
security of QKD. The phase error correction procedure
reduces the eavesdropper’s information on the key to an
exponentially small amount in terms of some security pa-
rameters. In other words, the phase error correction is
used for privacy amplification, whereas the bit-flip error
correction is used for error correction. The remenant of
the phase error correction procedure is a “coset extrac-
tion” procedure. This point has been emphasized in [13]
and will be recapitulated below.
D. Notation
Having introduced the above three major ingredients,
we shall give more specifics of the Shor-Preskill’s proof.
We shall mostly use the notations in [13]. For each qubit,
we use a canonical basis, |0〉 and |1〉. Define also the
basis, |+〉 and |−〉, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). The Hadamard transform, H , is a single
qubit unitary transformation of the form:
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. (1)
in the canoncial basis. It interchanges the bases |0〉, |1〉
and |+〉, |−〉.
Let us also introduce Pauli matrices,
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (2)
In what follows, we may simplify our notation and denote
the three Pauli matrices simply by X , Y and Z.
The Bell basis is an orthogonal basis for the quantum
state of two qubits. It has basis vectors,
Ψ± =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉), (3)
Φ± =
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉). (4)
1. CSS codes
Let us consider two classical binary codes, C1 and C2,
such that,
{0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , (5)
where Fn2 is the binary vector space of the n bits and
that both C1 and C
⊥
2 , the dual of C2 can correct up to t
errors. A basis for the CSS code can be found as follows.
For each v ∈ C1, define the vector
v → 1|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
|v + w〉. (6)
Notice that v1 and v2 give the same vector whenever
v1 − v2 ∈ C2. In other words, the codeword of the CSS
code corresponds to the coset of C2 in C1. Let H1 be the
parity check matrix for the code C1 and H2 for C
⊥
2 .
E. Secure QKD based on entanglement purification
Let us recapitulate the key point of Shor-Preskill’s
proof. As a starting point of their paper, they [13] proved
the security of the following QKD scheme:
Protocol 1 (in [13]): Modified Lo-Chau
(0) Alice and Bob decide on a large positive integer
n, a CSS code and a maximal number emax of check bit
errors that they tolerate in the protocol.
(1) Alice prepares 2n EPR pairs in the state (Φ+)2n.
(2) Alice picks a random 2n-bit string b and applies a
Hadamard transform H on the second half of each EPR
pair for which (the component of) b is 1.
(3) Alice sends the second halves of the EPR pairs to
Bob.
(4) Bob receives the qubits and publicly acknowledges
the completion of his reception.
(5) Alice selects randomly n of the 2n EPR pairs to
serve as check bits to test for the eavesdropper, Eve,’s
eavesdropping.
(6) Alice announces the bit string b and which n EPR
pairs are to be used as check bits.
(7) Bob performs a Hadamard transform on the qubits
where (the component of) b is 1.
(8) Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the
n check EPR pairs in the |0〉, |1〉 basis and broadcast
their results. If more than emax check bits disagree, they
abort. Otherwise, they proceed to the next step.
(9) Alice and Bob each measure σ
[r]
z for each row r ∈
H1 and σ
[r]
x for each row r ∈ H2. They broadcast their
results. Bob transforms his state accordingly to obtain
m nearly perfect EPR pairs.
(10) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the |0〉,
|1〉 basis to obtain a shared secret key.
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Remark: As discussed by Shor and Preskill, Alice
should also scramble the qubits by a random permutation
before sending them to Bob. Such a scrambling extends
the tolerable error rate from about 7 percents set by May-
ers [11] to about 11 percents in Shor-Preskill’s proof. We
shall assume that this is done.
The above protocol consists of two steps: a) verifica-
tion and b) privacy amplification/error correction. In
step a), Alice and Bob verify by random sampling that
the error rate of the transmission is smaller than some
prescribed value. Otherwise, they abort. In step b), Al-
ice and Bob employ the property of CSS code to correct
up to t errors and obtain privacy.
One can calculate the probability that the test on the
check bits is passed and yet the entanglement purification
procedure on the code bit fails. Since Eve does not know
which qubits are used as check bits and which as code
bits, she cannot treat them differently. In other words,
the check bits provide a random sample of all the bits.
Moreover, since all relevant measurements refer to the
Bell-bases and thus commute with each other, one can
apply a classical random sampling argument to estimate
the number of errors. By choosing an appropriate CSS
code and emax, one can ensure that this probability is
exponentially small in n. The readers should refer to
[13,15] for details.
F. Reduction to a quantum error-correcting code
protocol
Now, the above entanglement purification protocol
only involves one-way communication from Alice to Bob.
It has been shown [18] that any one-way purification
protocol can be reduced to a quantum error-correcting
code protocol. i.e., Instead of Alice preparing EPR pairs
and sending halves to Bob, Alice prepares an encoded
quantum state with a quantum error correcting code and
sends it to Bob.
More concretely, suppose Alice and Bob start with n
perfect EPR pairs. Suppose in step (9) Alice measures
the eigenvalues of σ
[r]
z for each row r ∈ H1 and σ[r]x for
each row r ∈ H2 and obtains the results, x and z respec-
tively. Her measurement will project the state of Bob into
the CSS codespace Qx,z, which has basis vectors indexed
by the coset of C2 in C1. For v ∈ C1, the corresponding
codeword is given by
v → 1|C2|1/2
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z·w|x+ v + w〉. (7)
The index, x, and z, defines a family of CSS codes,
Qx,z, with equivalent error correcting capability. In other
words, each of them can correct up to t phase errors and
t bit-flip errors.
Also, Alice may measure her half of the EPR pair be-
fore or after transmission. If she measures first, it will
be the same as she has chosen a random raw key k and
encoded it by Qx,z (i.e., take v = k in Eq. (7)).
G. Reduction to BB84
The property of CSS codes is used in the reduction
from a quantum error correcting code protocol to BB84.
Recall that the bit-flip and phase error correction proce-
dures decouple in a CSS code. What if Alice and Bob
simply drop the phase error correction procedure? The
resulting protocol is essentially BB84!
More concretely, since Bob does not really need the
phase error syndrome z to extract the value of the shared
key, there is no reason for Alice to send it. Let us now
consider the case when Alice has obtained a value k for
the raw key and does not send z. We can take the average
density matrix of Bob, over all values of z, thus obtaining:
1
2n|C2|
∑
z
∑
w1,w2∈C2(−1)(w1+w2)·z
× |k + w1 + x〉〈k + w2 + x|
= 1|C2|
∑
w∈C2 |k + w + x〉〈k + w + x|. (8)
This gives rise to a classical mixture of the states,
|k + w + x〉 with w randomly chosen from C2. Math-
ematically, the key extraction procedure is the same as
the following classical error correction/privacy amplifica-
tion procedure: Alice sends a random string v to Bob
and later broadcasts u + v where u is a random string
in C1. The key is then the coset, u + C2, of C2 in C1.
Bob receives a corrupted string v+e. He then substracts
Alice’s broadcast string u + v from his string to obtain
u + e. He corrects errors to find u in C1. He then finds
the final key to be u+ C2, which is a coset of C2 in C1.
III. BB84 VS SIX-STATE SCHEME
Let us look at Shor-Preskill’s proof of security of BB84
more closely by re-examining their underlying entangle-
ment purification protocol (EPP), Protocol 1. Recall
from subsection II B that one can employ the commuting
observable idea and only be concerned with probabilities
of their simultaneous eigenstates. In such a description,
one only considers the diagonal entries of the density ma-
trix with respect to the Bell-basis. Furthermore, in the
large N limit (where N is the number of pairs of qubits),
by random sampling, one should only be concerned with
the average density matrix. Therefore, one can reduce
the whole problem of purification of a general N -pair
state in QKD to the problem of purification of an ensem-
ble of N identical Bell-diagonal states. In what follows,
we will see that the four entries in the density matrix
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have interpretations in terms of the probabilities of a) no
error, b) a bit-flip error, but no phase error, c) a phase
error, but no bit-flip error and d) both bit-flip and phase
errors. A natural question to ask is: What are the corre-
lations between the bit-flip and phase errors?
We will now show that in Protocol 1, the bit-flip and
phase errors can be totally uncorrelated. In the language
of commuting observables and in the limit of large num-
ber of pairs, let us denote the effective density matrix
by:
diag(a, b, c, d). (9)
Here, we use the Bell-basis as in the notations of [18].
(See also Eqs. (3) and (4).) Now, the action of the
Hadamard transform in Eq. (1) will permute the four
matrix elements of Eq. (9) into:
diag(a, c, b, d). (10)
In Step 2 of Protocol 1, one applies randomly either
the identity or the Hadamard. Averaging over the two
cases: a) Identity and b) Hadamard, we find that the
effective average density matrix shared by Alice and Bob
after Step is of the form:
diag(a, (b+ c)/2, (b+ c)/2, d) = diag(a, e, e, d), (11)
where we define e = (b + c)/2.
As remarked earlier, the four entries represent, for each
shared pair between Alice and Bob, the four physical pos-
sibilities respectively: a) No error; b) bit-flip error, but
no phase error; c) phase error, but no bit-flip error; and
d) both bit-flip error and phase error. See, for example,
[18] for details. In the random sampling procedure—
Steps (5)-(8), the sample bit error rate found by Alice
and Bob will be approximately e + d. ∗∗ This leaves d
unconstrained in Shor-Preskill’s proof of security of BB84
scheme. The implication is that Alice and Bob cannot
possibly know of the correlations between the bit-flip and
the phase error. This is a serious limitation of the BB84
scheme. In the worst case situation, the bit-flip and phase
error are independent. This corresponds to the values,
e = (b+ c)/2 = p(1−p) and d = p2 for some 0 < p < 1.††
∗∗We remark that, owing to the symmetry between the two
bases, only a single bit error rate of the sample is required
to establish the security of the Shor-Preskill’s procedure. In
other words, there is no need to employ a refined data analysis
studied in [14].
††Owing to symmetrization by the Hadamard transform, two
of the diagonal entries in Eq. (11) are the same. This means
that the probability of having a bit-flip error but no phase
error is the same as that of having a phase error but no bit-flip
error. Now, suppose the two types of errors are independent.
They must occur independently with the same probability p.
This means that e = p(1 − p) and that d = p2, as stated in
the main text.
Let us now consider the six-state scheme. We will now
show that the situation there is completely different. In-
deed, we will establish that, for the six-state scheme, the
density matrix is that given by a depolarizing channel
and as such does have correlations between bit-flip and
phase errors. It is this correlations between bit-flip and
phase errors that will give the six-state scheme an advan-
tage over BB84.
As an analog of the Hadamard transform, which sym-
metrizes between the two bases—X and Z—in BB84,
in the six-state scheme we look for a symmetry operator
that will symmetrize between the three bases—X , Y and
Z. We find the operator (see, e.g., Eq. (15) of [19].)
T =
1√
2
(
1 −i
1 i
)
, (12)
which cyclically permutes the three bases. i.e.,
T : X → Y → Z → X. (13)
Suppose we apply either i) the identity operator; or ii)
T ; or iii) T 2 with equal probability to the density matrix
shown in Eq. 9. The average density matrix becomes
diag(a, (b+ c+ d)/3, (b+ c+ d)/3, (b+ c+ d)/3), (14)
which is totally symmetric with respect to the three
bases, X , Y and Z. This shows that the channel is effec-
tively a depolarizing channel [18]. More importantly, the
above four entries again represent the four possibilities:
a) No error; b) bit-flip error, but no phase error; c) phase
error, but no bit-flip error; and d) both bit-flip error and
phase error. This implies that there are non-trivial cor-
relations between bit-flip and phase errors.
Such non-trivial correlations can be exploited to design
a six-state error correction/privacy amplification proto-
col that tolerates a higher error rate than Shor-Preskill’s
protocol for BB84. The key point is that, the bit-flip
error pattern and the phase error pattern are no longer
independent in the six-state scheme. Therefore, given
the same bit error rate, the actual entropy of the density
matrix is smaller in the case of the six-state scheme, as
compared to the worst case situation in BB84.
More concretely, for the n imperfect EPR pairs shared
by Alice and Bob, let us denote by the variable X , the
phase error pattern and by Z, the bit-flip error pattern.
Now, the entropy of the whole error pattern is given by
H(X ,Z) = H(X ) +H(Z)− I(X ;Z). (15)
The fact that the phase and bit-flip error patterns are
correlated means that I(X ;Z) > 0. Consider now the
following strategy of quantum error correction.
Subrountine A: Modified “random” hashing
procedure with CSS codes
(I) Alice and Bob apply a random hashing code on
the Z variable only to identify the bit-flip error pattern.
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Note that (slightly more than) H(Z) rounds of random
hashing is needed.
(II) Alice and Bob use the information on the bit-flip
error pattern to reduce their ignorance on the phase error
pattern from H(X ) to H(X|Z) = H(X ) − I(X ;Z) =
H(X ,Z)−H(Z).
(III) Alice and Bob apply a random hashing code on
the X variable only to identify the phase error pattern.
Note that only (slightly more than) H(X ,Z) − H(Z)
rounds of random hashing is needed.
Remark: Bennett, DiVincenzo, Smolin and Wootters
(BDSW) [18] have studied a random hashing scheme in
entanglement purification. Our random hashing code is
analogous, except that we restrict our attention to CSS
codes. Therefore, in (I), all the operators are chosen to be
tensor products of Z operators only and in (III), X oper-
ators only. Nonetheless, in the asymptotic limit of large
number of pairs, our scheme is equally efficient as the
original random hashing scheme by BDSW. In BDSW,
it was shown that the scheme gives non-zero rate of dis-
tilled entanglement when the fidelity f > 0.81071. Since
f = 1−3p/2 for a depolarizing channel, this corresponds
to a bit error rate of about 12.6 percents.
Remark: By adopting a modified version of the
DiVincenzo-Shor-Smolin code [20], a slightly higher er-
ror rate of about 12.7 percents can be tolerated in the
six-state scheme. DSS code consists of the concate-
nated of a non-random (cat) code with random hash-
ing code. It is one of the few examples of a so-called
degenerate code and gives better performance than any
known non-degenerate code. Note that the non-random
(cat) code is a CSS-code. Since we have given a mod-
ified version of the random hashing code that is a CSS
code, the concatenated code can, therefore, also be mod-
ified into a CSS code. While the actual improvement—
12.7 percents vs 12.6 percents—is quite small, the re-
sult is conceptually interesting because it shows that a
degenerate code can be employed in the underlying en-
tanglement purification protocol in i) establishing a se-
cure error-correction/privacy amplification protocol for
the six-state QKD scheme and ii) tolerating a higher er-
ror rate than any known non-degenerate codes.
IV. PROTOCOL FOR SECURE SIX-STATE QKD
SCHEME
Following our discussion in the last section, we now
give the details of our procotol for secure six-state QKD
scheme. We claim the following modified QKD scheme
is secure. For conciseness, we omit the steps that are
identical to Protocol 1. We replace some of the steps of
Protocol 1 by the following.
Protocol 1’: QKD based on entanglement pu-
rification
(0’) Alice and Bob decide on a large positive integer
n and a maximal number emax of check bit errors that
they tolerate in the protocol.
(2’) Alice selects a random 2n-trit t, and performs I,
T or T 2 on the second half of each EPR pair if (the
component of) t is 0, 1 or 2 respectively.
(6’) Alice announces the trit string t and which n EPR
pairs to be check bits.
(7’) Bob performs I, T−1 or T−2 on the qubits depend-
ing on the value of (the component of) t.
(9’) Alice and Bob apply Subrountine A (the modified
random hashing procedure with CSS codes discussed in
the last section) to correct the (correlated) bit-flip and
phase errors. They broadcast their results. Bob trans-
forms his state accordingly to obtain m nearly perfect
EPR pairs (which are shared with Alice).
The proof of security is analogus to Shor-Preskill’s
proof.
A. Reduction to six-state protocol
Furthermore, the various reduction arguments of Shor-
Preskill directly carry over and reduce Protocol 1’ to a
six-state protocol. From the security of Protocol 1’, we
have proven the security of the six-state protocol.
More specifically, the quantum key distribution Proto-
col 1’, which is based on a one-way entanglement purifi-
cation protocol, is mathematically equivalent to a proto-
col based on a class of CSS code. Furthermore, by the
virtue of CSS codes, the phase error-correcting procedure
is essentially decoupled from the bit-flip error-correcting
procedure. Since the phase errors do not affect the value
of the final key, the phase error correction procedure can
be simply dropped. Put in another way, Alice could have
done the procedure with any CSS code in the same fam-
ily (they are all related by phase errors to one another).
Mathematically, the mixture of the CSS codes in the
family is equivalent to a classical code (with the corre-
sponding error correction and privacy amplification pro-
cedure). Therefore, the protocol can be reduced to the a
simple “prepare and measure” protocol, namely the six-
state scheme. The maximal tolerable bit error rate of the
six-state scheme with our error-correction/privacy ampli-
fication procedure is 12.6 percents for modified random
hashing with CSS codes (and 12.7 percents if we employ
a modified DSS code described in the last Section).
Inamori [17] has recently proposed a proof based on
a different approach which gives a higher tolerable error
rate of about 13%. However, unlike the present proof, In-
amori’s proof requires two-way communications between
Alice and Bob.
In conclusion, we have proven the security of the six-
state quantum key distribution up to a bit error rate of
12.7 percents.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We shall conclude with a few remarks.
A. Efficient six-state scheme and proof of its
unconditional security
In the six-state scheme, Alice and Bob independently
and randomly choose between three bases. Therefore,
two-thirds of the times they disagree and have to throw
away their polarization data. We remark that they can
improve the efficiency of scheme substantially by choos-
ing the three bases with different probabilities, say ǫ, ǫ
and 1 − 2ǫ. This ensures that the efficiency is greater
than (1 − 2ǫ)2. As ǫ → 0, the efficiency asymptotically
goes to 100%.
Whereas in the standard six-state scheme the compu-
tation of only a single error rate is required for its proof
of security, for this efficient scheme to be secure, it is
now necessary to use a refined data analysis [14]. One
should divide up the data according to the various bases
in which they are transmitted and received and compute
the error rate for each basis separately and demand that
all the error rates are small.
Note that the scheme is insecure when ǫ is exactly zero.
The constraint on ǫ has been discussed. Basically, it is
necessary that Nǫ2 > m where N is the total number
of photons transmitted from Alice to Bob and m is the
minimal number of photons needed for an accurate es-
timation of the error rate of the data. The numerical
value of m must scale at least as logN . But, it is a priori
unnecessary for it to scale linearly with N . We remark
that the unconditional security of the efficient four-state
scheme has been proven in [14]. It is straightforward to
apply the techniques developed there to prove the un-
conditional security of the efficient six-state scheme up
to the same error rate of 12.7 percents.
B. Security of other QKD schemes
The security of some other QKD schemes remains to be
explored. In particular, it would be interesting to study
the security of the B92 scheme [23] with noises. It is not
entirely obvious to us how the Shor-Preskill’s techniques
can be applied to B92.
C. Real life issues
Our result only applies to an idealized situation. In a
real experiment, the source of EPR pairs are imperfect;
the channel is lossy and the detector efficiency is far from
perfect. It would be interesting to explore the security of
the six-state in a real world situation. For BB84, some
works along those lines have been done by researchers
including Lu¨tkenhaus [25,24].
In a recent preprint, Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and Mayers
[26] have proposed a proof of security of a weak coher-
ent state implementation of the BB84 scheme. A key
assumption is that, given any quantum signal, indepen-
dent of the basis of measurement chosen by Bob, Bob’s
detection efficiency stays the same. (One can imagine
that Bob chooses his measurement basis by pushing a
button. Then, independent of which button his pushes,
it is assumed that the measurement will with the same
probability be successful. In other words, the signals can-
not behave differently according to the basis chosen by
Bob. Cf. Trojan Horse attack in the next subsection.)
This assumption is closely related to the detectors’ loop-
hole problem in the testing of Bell’s inequalities. Given
rather imperfect detectors, testing of Bell’s inequalities
often assumes that the detected sample provides a fair
representation of all the signals, detected or not.
The Shor-Preskill’s proof is a fine theoretical result.
However, if one would like to apply the result, one needs
to make sure that the amount of computing power re-
quired is reasonable. It is not entirely clear to us that
this is the case. Some discussion has been made in [24].
D. Trojan Horse problem
In proofs of security of QKD schemes, it is often as-
sumed that the signals transmitted from Alice to Bob
lives in a two-dimensional space. How can one be sure
that there is no hidden Trojan Horse in the signal? For
instance, the signal may, in principle, be made up of two
parts, one is the usual quantum signal, the other is a
robot that will explore Alice or Bob’s system and tell the
first part of the signal to behave differently according
to, for example, the basis of measurement actually em-
ployed by Bob. Notice that the Trojan Horse can break
the quantum crypto-system without directly leaking out
information from Bob’s laboratory to Eve!
One might naively think that QKD provides more
room for the Trojan Horse attack. Fortunately, it has
been pointed out (Note 21 of [8]) that this Trojan Horse
problem in quantum cryptography is no worse than in
classical cryptography: By using teleportation, any quan-
tum signal can be reduced to classical one. Therefore, Al-
ice and Bob only need to receive classical signals anyway.
This teleportation trick requires only the experimental
implementation of teleportation, rather than a full-blown
quantum computer.
7
E. Bell’s inequality with untrusted imperfect
apparatus
Another question is whether Alice and Bob can buy
their quantum cryptographic devices from untrusted ven-
dors and verify their security by doing some simple test-
ing themselves. By assuming that Alice and Bob’s labo-
ratory can be sufficiently shielded from the environment,
a procedure to prove security based only on input/output
probabilities (that corresponds to a choice of several local
measurements by Alice and Bob and the corresponding
measurement outcomes) has been provided for the case of
perfect EPR pairs [27]. It would, thus, be interesting to
generalize the result to the case of imperfect EPR sources
and measuring apparatus. (See also Subsection VC.)
This line of research can also be re-phrased as a general-
ization of Bell’s inequality to the case of a limited amount
of entanglement. The question there becomes: given a
fixed amount of entanglement, how far can Bell’s inequal-
ity be violated? Conversely, given some experimental vi-
olations of Bell’s inequality on some random sample, can
one deduce the minimal amount of entanglement shared
by Alice and Bob? Interesting questions include what
type of privacy amplication/error correction procedures
can be employed to prove unconditional security in this
untrusted situation.
In summary, there is no doubt in our mind that QKD
provides a fertile real-life playground for the various con-
cepts in quantum information theory. Moreover, these
interactions between theory and practice will most likely
inspire new research avenues on both sides.
Notes Added: Recently, Gottesman and Lo [28] have
proven the security of the six-state scheme up to a bit
error rate of about 23 percents. However, their method
employs two-way classical communications between Al-
ice and Bob. They also show that, by allowing two-way
classical communications, BB84 scheme can be made un-
conditionally secure up to an error rate of 17 percents.
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